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THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S FREEDOM OF HARASSMENT 
 
DISTRICT COURT OF NEW YORK 
NASSAU COUNTY 
People v. Pierre-Louis1 
(decided July 25, 2011) 
 
Defendant Nicolas Pierre-Louis was charged with aggravated 
harassment, under New York Penal Law section 240.30(1),2 for a se-
ries of profane telephone calls made to two Nassau County Assistant 
District Attorneys (ADA).3  Pierre-Louis filed a motion to dismiss, 
pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law sections 170.30,4 
170.35,5 100.156 and 100.40,7 arguing that even though his statements 
 
1 927 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Dist. Ct. 2011). 
2 N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30(1) (McKinney 2012): 
A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, 
with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or she: 
1. Either (a) communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by 
telephone, by telegraph, or by mail, or by transmitting or delivering any 
other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause an-
noyance or alarm; or (b) causes a communication to be initiated by me-
chanical or electronic means or otherwise with a person, anonymously or 
otherwise, by telephone, by telegraph, or by mail, or by transmitting or 
delivering any other form of written communication, in a manner likely 
to cause annoyance or alarm . . . . 
Id. 
3 Pierre-Louis, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 593. 
4 N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 170.30 (McKinney 2012) (“After arraignment upon an informa-
tion, a simplified information, a prosecutor‟s information or a misdemeanor complaint, the 
local criminal court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss such instrument or any 
count thereof upon the ground that: (a) It is defective, within the meaning of section 
170.35.”). 
5 New York Criminal Procedure Law section 170.35, titled “Motion to Dismiss Informa-
tion, Simplified Information, Prosecutor‟s Information or Misdemeanor Complaint; as De-
fective,” reads, in pertinent part: 
An information, a simplified information, a prosecutor‟s information or a 
misdemeanor complaint, or a count thereof, is defective within the mean-
ing of paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 170.30 when: (a) It is 
1
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may have been vulgar and derisive, his speech was constitutionally 
protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,8 as well as under article I, section eight of the New York Consti-
tution.9  The Nassau County District Court found that while Pierre-
Louis‟s statements were “vituperative in nature, the statements [did] 
not rise to level of „fighting words‟ . . . nor [did] they rise to the level 
of a true threat”; and therefore, constituted constitutionally protected 
speech.10  The court further held that the New York aggravated ha-
rassment statute was unconstitutional as applied to this case and did 
not allow for the statute‟s unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth 
to be cured.11 
Between February 22, 2010, and April 11, 2010, defendant 
Pierre-Louis left several telephone voice mail messages at the office 
of a Nassau County Assistant District Attorney.12  In these voice 
 
not sufficient on its face pursuant to the requirements of section 100.40; 
provided that such an instrument or count may not be dismissed as de-
fective, but must instead be amended, where the defect or irregularity is 
of a kind that may be cured by amendment and where the people move 
to so amend . . . . 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.35 (McKinney 2012). 
6 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Law § 100.15 (McKinney 2012) (stating the requirements for the form 
and content of a misdemeanor complaint and a felony complaint). 
7 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1) (McKinney 2012) (listing what is needed for a crimi-
nal charge to be sufficient on its face). 
8 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in pertinent part, “Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
9 Article I, section 8 of the New York Constitution reads, in pertinent part, “Every citizen 
may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible 
for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of 
speech or of the press.”  N.Y. CONST. art I, § 8. 
10 Pierre-Louis, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 595. 
11 Id. at 597.  The People contested Pierre-Louis‟ motion, but also moved to amend the 
information, under section 170.35 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, if the court 
should so hold it defective.  Id. at 593.  The court quoted the opinion in Dietze, stating: 
While it is argued that the statute‟s unconstitutional overbreadth might 
be cured by restricting its reach to “fighting words” or other words 
which, by themselves, inflict substantial personal injury, such a “cure” 
would, indeed, be fraught with significant problems of its own.  First, al-
though to be sure, a statute ought normally to be saved by construing it 
in accord with constitutional requirements, it is basic that the very lan-
guage of the statute must be fairly susceptible of such an interpretation; 
put otherwise, the saving construction must be one which the court “may 
reasonably find implicit” in the words used by the Legislature. 
Id. at 597 (citation omitted from original). 
12 Id. at 593. 
2
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messages Pierre-Louis yelled and screamed profanities at the ADA in 
response to the ADA‟s failure to arrest a certain Jessy Pierre-Louis.13  
In the recordings, Pierre-Louis stated that he was “coming at [the 
ADA] with fury” and that he would continue calling until the arrest 
was finally made.14
 
The ADA stated in the People‟s supporting disposition that 
Pierre-Louis left other profane messages which were both “alarming 
and annoying.”15  The ADA further stated that the repeated calls, 
coupled with Pierre-Louis‟s “screaming outbursts of rage and anger,” 
led her to fear for her “safety and [for] the safety of [another] Assis-
tant District Attorney.”16  Defendant Pierre-Louis argued that even 
though his statements were profane and offensive, the statements 
were protected by the First Amendment and could not subject him to 
criminal liability for aggravated harassment under section 240.30(1) 
of the New York Penal Law.17
 
The Nassau County District Court granted Pierre-Louis‟s mo-
tion to dismiss on the ground that Pierre-Louis‟s speech was constitu-
tionally protected under the First Amendment.18  After reviewing re-
levant Supreme Court case law, the court in Pierre-Louis found that 
the statements made by Pierre-Louis did not contain “fighting words” 
and did not present a “true threat,” because the statements were too 
vague.19  The court stated that, even though Pierre-Louis‟s voice mail 
recordings were offensive to the ADA, the threats were limited to 
having the ADA fired.20  Furthermore, the court in Pierre-Louis 
found that the aggravated harassment statute was unconstitutional as 
applied in Pierre-Louis.21 
In holding that Pierre-Louis‟s statements were constitutionally 
protected speech, the court in Pierre-Louis first recognized that free 
speech is a fundamental right granted by the First Amendment of the 
 




17 Id. at 594. 
18 Pierre-Louis, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 595. 
19 Id.  According to the court “[e]ven the worst of the alleged statements, „I‟m coming at 
you with fury,‟ is too vague to be considered a true threat, but is more properly understood in 
context with the defendant‟s other statements.”  Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 597. 
3
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United States Constitution as well as by article I, section eight of the 
New York State Constitution.22  However, the court also noted that 
the right to free speech is not an absolute right and that, in certain cir-
cumstances, it may be proscribed by the state.23  In order for there to 
be a proscription on the First Amendment‟s right of free speech, there 
must be a clear definition of the restriction “so as not to have a chill-
ing effect upon speech that is permissible.”24  “Through the years, the 
court has sought to define the areas in which the proscription of free 
speech is justified.”25 
The United States federal courts, in determining whether “the 
proscription of free speech is justified,”26 first refer to the seminal 
case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.27  In Chaplinsky, the United 
States Supreme Court proscribed the use of “fighting words.”28  De-
fendant Walter Chaplinsky was convicted for violating Chapter 378, 
section 2 of the Public Laws of New Hampshire, which made it a 
crime for an individual to “address any offensive, derisive or annoy-
ing word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other 
public place, . . . [or] call him by any offensive or derisive name 
. . . .”29  Chaplinsky argued that the statute violated the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution because it unreasonably re-
strained his freedom of speech, press and religion.30  The Court ac-
 




26 Id.  
27 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
28 Id. at 571-72. 
29 Id. at 569.  Chaplinsky, a Jehovah Witness, was distributing literature of his sect on the 
street while allegedly denouncing all religion, causing the rise of a disturbance.  Id. at 569-
70.  As a result of the riot, Chaplinsky was led to a police station by an on duty traffic offic-
er, when they encountered City Marshall, Bowering.  Id. at 570.  Chaplinksy allegedly stated 
to City Marshall Bowering, “You are a God damned racketeer and a damned Fascist and the 
whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists.”  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 
569.  Chaplinsky‟s version of the event differed from that of Bowering.  Id. at 570.  Chap-
linsky alleged that when he encountered Bowering, he requested for Bowering to arrest those 
responsible for causing the disturbance.  Id.  Bowering responded by cursing at him. Id.  
Chaplinsky contests using the name of the Deity, but admits to stating everything else set-
forth in the complaint.  Id. 
30 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.  The Court only warranted Chaplinsky‟s attack of the sta-
tute on the basis of free speech.  Id. at 571.  The court noted that the written word was not 
involved, and that it cannot be said that cursing an officer is at all related to freedom of wor-
ship.  Id. 
4
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knowledged that both the freedom of speech and the freedom of the 
press are fundamental rights protected by the First Amendment made 
available to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.31  The Supreme 
Court began its decision by first exploring the statute itself.32  The 
Supreme Court recognized that the right of free speech is not an abso-
lute right and proscribed the use of “fighting words.”33  The Court 
concluded that the First Amendment does not protect words of lewd-
ness, obscenity, profanity, or fighting words—words that “by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace.”34 
Since Chaplinsky, the United States Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion permits certain restrictions on speech.35  In Brandenburg v. 
Ohio,36 the Court used a two-prong test to determine when the State 
can proscribe speech.37  According to the Court, speech can be pro-
 
31 Id. at 570. 
32 Id. at 571.  The Court noted that the statute could be divided into two separate provi-
sions, the first relating “to words or names addressed to another in a public place[,]” and the 
second, relating to “noises and exclamations.”  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S at 572.  The Court as-
sumed, but did not so hold, that the second provision of the statute was unconstitutional, and 
therefore limited their exploration of the statute to the first provision.  Id.  In making its de-
termination that the statute was valid, the Supreme Court referred back to prior case-law in 
which the state court found that the statute sought to protect public peace, and that the only 
words prohibited were those which ignited violence.  Id. at 573.  The proper test was found 
to be “what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause 
an average addressee to fight.”  Id.  The Court concluded: 
The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face 
words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the address, words 
whose speaking constitute a breach of the peace by the speaker—
including “classical fighting words,” words in current less “classical” but 
equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words, including 
profanity, obscenity and threats. 
Id.  The statute punished “verbal acts” and was drafted carefully so as to not “impair liberty 
of expression.”  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574. 
33 Id. at 571-72. 
34 Id. at 572.  Fighting words are not protected by the First Amendment because they are 
not an “essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”  Id. at 572.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) 
(recognizing that speech which “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action” is not warranted under the First Amendment). 
35 See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (listing all the examples of when the Supreme Court has 
proscribed free speech). 
36 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
37 Id. at 447. 
5
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scribed if it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion” and “likely to incite or produce such action.”38  The Court rea-
soned that unless those two elements are found, “the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to for-
bid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation.”39 
Twenty-nine years after Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court was 
presented with Cohen v. California,40 and once again reiterated that 
the states have the authority to prohibit the use of fighting words.
41
  
The Court described them as being “those personally abusive epithets 
which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of 
common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.”42  
However, the Court concluded that the defendant‟s wearing of a 
jacket, bearing the words “Fuck the Draft,” did not constitute fighting 
words, as proscribed by Chaplinsky, for it was not directed as a per-
sonal insult, and did not incite violence.43 
Several years after the Chaplinsky, Brandenburg, and Cohen 
decisions, the United States once again recognized that the protec-
tions afforded to speech by the First Amendment are not absolute 
protections.44  In Virginia v. Black,45 the Court found that the states 
 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
41 Id. at 20. 
42 Id. (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
43 Id. at 16, 18.  The defendant in this action, Paul Robert Cohen, was convicted for violat-
ing section 415 of California‟s Penal Code which calls for the imprisonment of persons “ma-
liciously and willfully disturbing the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . 
offensive conduct.”  Id. at 16.  Cohen was said to have violated the statute by wearing a 
jacket to the Los Angeles County Courthouse, which bore the words “Fuck the Draft.”  Co-
hen, 403 U.S. at 16.  Cohen testified that his wearing the jacket represented his deep resent-
ment against the Vietnam War and the draft.  Id.  The Court recognized that Cohen neither 
participated in violence, or threatened to, nor did he cause others to engage in violence.  Id. 
at 16-17.  Thus, the Supreme Court reversed Cohen‟s conviction and stated: 
[T]he State certainly lacks power to punish Cohen for the underlying 
content of the message the inscription conveyed.  At least so long as 
there is no showing of an intent to incite disobedience to or disruption of 
the draft, Cohen could not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, be punished for asserting the evident position on the in-
utility or immorality of the draft his jacket reflected. 
Id. at 18. 
44 See Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (finding that the First Amendment does not grant absolute 
protection and may be regulated by the government). 
45 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 3, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/11
 
2012] FIRST AMENDMENT 641 
may also proscribe “true threats”—“those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group 
of individuals.”46  In Black, respondents Barry Black, Richard Elliot, 
and Jonathan O‟Mara were all Ku Klux Klan members and were each 
convicted separately for burning crosses in violation of Virginia‟s 
cross-burning statute.47
  
In addressing the constitutionality of the 
cross-burning statute, the Supreme Court noted that those persons 
who burn crosses directed at a particular individual often intend for it 
to be received with fear.48  While the First Amendment protects free-
dom of expression, the Court acknowledged that case law showed 
that this right was not absolute and that free speech may be pro-
scribed.49  The Court recognized that “the government may regulate 
certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”50  
The Supreme Court thus concluded that true threats may be pro-
scribed.51  The Court defined true threats: 
True threats encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of 
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals.  The 
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.  
Rather, a prohibition on true threats protects individu-
 
46 Id. at 359.  See also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (recognizing that 
“threats must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech” and proscrib-
ing the use of “true threats”).  In Watts, the defendant was convicted for violating a statute 
which prohibited “any person from „knowingly and willfully . . . making any threat to take 
the life of or inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States . . . .‟ ”  Id. at 705.  
The defendant was arrested for stating the following during a public rally: 
“They always holler at us to get an education.  And now I have already 
received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my 
physical this Monday coming.  I am not going.  If they ever make me 
carry a riffle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”  “They are 
not going to make me kill my black brothers.” 
Id. at 706.  The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, but held that it was 
inapplicable in the Watts case.  Id. at 707. 
47 Black, 538 U.S. at 348. 
48 Id. at 357.  “[O]ften the cross burned intends that the recipients of the message fear for 
their lives.  And when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any messages are more 
powerful.”  Id. 
49 Id. at 358. 
50 Id. 
51 Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60. 
7
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als from the fear of violence and from the disruption 
that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people 
from the possibility that the threatened violence will 
occur.  Intimidation in the constitutionally proscriba-
ble sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a 
speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons 
with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily 
harm or death.52  
While the Supreme Court has made clear that some speech 
may be proscribed, it has invalidated laws that proscribe speech, 
which it deemed to be entitled to the protections of the First Amend-
ment.53  For instance, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the 
New York State Crime Victims Bd.,54 the Court held that 
“[r]egulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the 
basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First 
Amendment.”55  Thus, the Son of Sam Law at issue in Simon & 
Schuster was held to be inconsistent with the First Amendment for 
New York because it “singled out speech on a particular subject for a 
financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other in-
come.”56  
Similarly, New York courts have also invalidated statutes as 
violative of the First Amendment‟s right to free speech.57  The lead-
ing case in New York State to have invalidated a statute found to un-
constitutionally proscribe free speech is People v. Dietze.58  In Dietze, 
the court convicted the defendant for harassment under subdivisions 
one and two of the New York Penal Law section 240.25.59  The court 
 
52 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
53 Pierre-Louis, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 594.  See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 
(1984) (stating that “[r]egulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis 
of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment”); R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (recognizing the invalidity of content-based regu-
lations because “[t]he First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing 
speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed”). 
54 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
55 Id. at 116 (quotation omitted). 
56 Id. at 123. 
57 See People v. Dietze, 549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1989) (holding New York Penal Law sec-
tion 240.25(2) unconstitutional for proscribing speech entitled to constitutional protection). 
58 549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1989). 
59 Id. at 1167.  The defendant allegedly approached the complainant  and her son, and re-
ferred to the complainant “as a „bitch‟ and to her son as a „dog,‟ and said that she would beat 
8
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sentenced the defendant to pay a fine of fifty dollars, and imposed a 
surcharge of fifteen days imprisonment in the event that the defen-
dant is unable to pay said amount.60  The defendant argued that sub-
division two of section 240.25 was “unconstitutionally overbroad be-
cause its prohibitions extend to a great deal of protected speech as 
well as to unprotected obscenities and „fighting words.‟ ”61 
The court in Dietze found that it had enough evidence to sup-
port a finding that the defendant had the “requisite intent” under sec-
tion 240.25(2) to “harass” or “annoy”; however, the defendant‟s 
words did not fall within any of the proscribed categories established 
by precedent.62  Thus, the New York Court of Appeals held section 
240.25(2), Harassment in the First Degree, of the New York Penal 
Law to be unconstitutional.63  The Court of Appeals reasoned that 
section 240.25(2) was unconstitutional “[b]ecause the statute, on its 
face, prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected ex-
pression, and because its continued existence presents a significant 
risk of prosecution for the mere exercise of free speech.”64  
Similarly, in People v. Mangano,65 the New York Court of 
Appeals recognized that speech, even if found to be offensive, which 
does not fall within one of the defined areas of proscribed speech is 
constitutionally protected free speech.66  The defendant in Mangano 
was charged with five counts of harassment in the second degree for 
violating section 240.30(1) of the New York Penal Law.67  The de-
fendant was said to have left five messages on the answering machine 
of the Village of Ossining‟s Parking Violations Bureau (“the Bu-
 
the crap out of [her] some day or night on the street.”  Id.  The defendant knew of the wom-
an‟s mental state.  Id.  Additionally, the defendant had previously been warned by a police 
officer to not argue with the complainant again.  Id.  
60 Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1167-68. 
61 Id. at 1168. 
62 Id.  “[T]he evidence that defendant was aware of the complainants disability, that she 
had previously been admonished by a police officer, and that her name-calling was unpro-
voked was sufficient to support a finding that defendant had the requisite intent to „harass‟ or 
„annoy‟ the complainant.”  Id. 
63 Id. at 1167.  Section 2 of 240.25 Harassment in the First Degree read as follows: “A 
person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person: 
(2) In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture.”  
Pierre-Louis, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 595. 
64 Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1167. 
65 796 N.E.2d 470 (N.Y. 2003). 
66 Id. at 471. 
67 Id.  See N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30(1), supra note 2. 
9
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reau”).68  The Village of Ossining restricted overnight parking be-
tween the hours of three in the morning to six in the morning.69  Os-
sining residents were to leave messages, after five in the evening, on 
the Bureau‟s telephone answering machine in order to prevent their 
overnight guests from receiving tickets.70  Callers were to give the li-
cense plate number of the automobile, as well as provide a descrip-
tion of both the vehicle and the parking designation.
71
  Callers were 
also allowed to leave complaints on the Bureau‟s answering ma-
chine.72 
On August 22, 1998, and August 26, 1998, the defendant left 
about five messages on the Bureau‟s machine after hours.73  The de-
fendant mentioned vehicles and license plate numbers, and then 
wished two employees and their families poor health, gave com-
plaints of their poor job performance, and also complained of the 
tickets she had been given.74  At trial, the jury convicted the defen-
dant of four out of the five counts, which was then affirmed by the 
Appellate Division.75  The New York Court of Appeals reversed the 
defendant‟s conviction, holding that while the defendant‟s messages 
were offensive, they were “made in the context of complaining about 
government actions, on a telephone answering machine set up for the 
purpose . . . of receiving complaints from the public.”76  The Court 
disagreed with the People‟s contentions that “appellant‟s messages 
[fell] within any of the proscribable classes of speech or conduct.”77  
A similar challenge was presented in People v. Yablov.78  In 
Yablov, the court found the harassment statute in question to be fa-
cially insufficient for proscribing speech entitled to First Amendment 
protection and therefore granted the defendant‟s motion to dismiss.79  
The defendant in this action, Shiela Yablov, was charged with violat-
 
68 Mangano, 796 N.E.2d at 470-71. 




73 Mangano, 796 N.E.2d at 470-71. 
74 Id. at 471. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. (alteration in original). 
78 706 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 2000). 
79 Id. at 592. 
10
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ing sections 240.30 and 240.26 of the New York Penal Law.80  The 
defendant allegedly left a series of messages during a period of se-
venteen months on the complainant‟s answering machine, after the 
complainant ended their romantic relationship.81  Defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute was facially insufficient 
under sections 170.35(1)(a) and 100.40 of the New York Criminal 
Procedure Law.82  Defendant Yablov further argued that her voice 
messages did not establish the elements of aggravated harassment 
and therefore her speech could not be proscribed.83  The court found 
that while the defendant‟s actions were “offensive and obnoxious,” 
they were not criminal and could therefore not be proscribed.84  Thus, 
the court held the accusatory instrument to be facially insufficient.85 
While the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 8 of the New York State Constitution provide 
for the protection of free speech, both the Supreme Court as well as 
the New York Court of Appeals have recognized that the First 
Amendment does not afford absolute protection, and that speech can 
therefore be proscribed.86  Federal courts as well as New York State 
courts require clear definitions of what is being proscribed before set-
ting such restrictions on the freedom of speech.87  The court in 
Pierre-Louis followed Supreme Court precedent as well as prior New 
York case law in holding that Defendant Pierre-Louis‟s statements 
were constitutionally protected.88  The court held that although “vul-
gar and vituperative in nature, [Pierre-Louis‟s] statements [did] not 
rise to the level of „fighting words‟ as described by Chaplinsky and 
Cohen nor do they rise to the level of a true threat,” as proscribed by 
Watts and Black.89 
The court in Pierre-Louis accurately relied on Dietze in de-
 
80 Id. at 591. 
81 Id.  “On one occasion, from approximately six [in the evening] until six [in the morn-
ing], the complainant received at least twenty-two [phone] calls from the defendant.”  Id. at 
591-92. 
82 Yablov, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 592.  See CRIM. PROC. § 170.35, supra note 5; CRIM. PROC. § 
100.40, supra note 7. 
83 Yablov, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 592. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Pierre-Louis, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 594. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 594-97. 
89 Id. at 595. 
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termining that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Pierre-
Louis.90  The court noted that it has commonly been argued that New 
York‟s Aggravated Harassment statute should be upheld, both as a 
means of justification as well as a mechanism in which to distinguish 
it from the Dietze statute, on the basis that it protects an individual‟s 
privacy rights by prohibiting a “trespass by telephone.”91  The court 
in Pierre-Louis correctly found that this argument failed for a number 
of reasons.92  First, the statute had been used in cases where there 
were not any privacy rights at issue.93  Second, legislative intent 
shows that the statute is meant to include circumstances in which 
communication occurs—it matters not who initiated the communica-
tion.94  Third, even if the communication was initiated by the defen-
dant, this alone would be an insufficient basis for a “trespass by tele-
phone” assertion.95  Labeling such conduct a “trespass by telephone” 
solely because of “the content of the communication would be viola-
tive of basic and fundamental principles of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”96  Finally, contemporary society requires that more 
than just an annoying telephone call be made in order to show that a 
substantial privacy interest was violated.
97
  Today, many people tra-
vel with mobile phones, both making and receiving many phone calls 
while on the go, which requires that privacy interests be carefully 
scrutinized.98 
The argument for justifying the constitutionality of the sta-
tute—Pierre-Louis‟s statements were unconstitutional under the sta-
tute for it represented a “trespass by telephone,” appropriately failed 
in Pierre-Louis.  Pierre-Louis left messages on a machine which was 
 
90 Id. at 594-97. 
91 Pierre-Louis, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 596. 
92 Id. 
93 Id.  See People v. Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d 169 (App. Div. 1st Dept 1985) (holding that 
distribution of profane and obscene magazines was protected by the First Amendment).  The 
Appellate Court reasoned that “[e]ven if the material in the magazine was provocative, that 
would not render its distribution the equivalent of „fighting words‟ so as to except such ac-
tivity from the protection of the First Amendment.”  Id. at 176  Defendant‟s act of distribut-
ing the magazine was “neither a violent nor a potentially violent act.”  Id. 
94 Pierre-Louis, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 596. 
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set up for that exact purpose for which it was used.99  The court in 
Pierre-Louis acknowledged that Defendant Pierre-Louis allegedly 
called a Nassau County Assistant District Attorney and left messages 
using profane and derogatory language.100   
However, derogatory statements alone did not constitute a 
trespass by telephone because the calls were made on a telephone line 
which had been set up for the purpose of both receiving and sending 
telephone calls from the public.101 
While many of Pierre-Louis‟s messages may have contained 
profanity and were highly offensive, they were constitutionally pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment.102  Although it may be ar-
gued that many would find Pierre-Louis‟s repeated phone calls and 
profane statements to be severe harassment, the decision in Pierre-
Louis is warranted for freedom of speech is a right which should not 
be restricted unless it clearly falls within one of the categories pro-
scribed by prior case law.  Otherwise, courts would unreasonably and 
arbitrarily limit the freedom of speech in some cases. 
On the other hand, the Pierre-Louis decision might also 
present problems.  For instance, individuals may continue to argue 
that they engaged in free speech in cases in which they intentionally 
harass another with the use of profanity and obscenity.  The Pierre-
Louis decision may lead to the start of violence if individuals cannot 
seek protection from harassment through the judiciary.  For example, 
in the Pierre-Louis decision Defendant Pierre-Louis left several voice 
mail messages on the answering machine of two Nassau County 
ADA‟s which not only contained profanity, but contained threats to 
the lives of these ADA‟s.103 
 
As previously stated, Pierre-Louis stated 
that he was coming at the ADA with fury if his demands were not 
met and then sought free speech as his defense.104  Here, the ADA 
feared for her life and turned to seek protection from the court, which 
was not granted.  If this issue were to arise in another situation, some 
may respond with violence rather than turning to the court at all out 
of desperate fear. 
 
99 Pierre-Louis, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 597. 
100 Id. at 595.  
101 Id. at 597. 
102 Id. at 595. 
103 Id. at 593. 
104 Pierre-Louis, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 593, 594. 
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This violence issue may be resolved if the Supreme Court 
creates a better definition of exactly which statements are to be la-
beled “fighting words,” and draws a clear line between what is con-
stitutionally protected speech and what is clear harassment.  The two-
prong test used by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg is overly broad 
and should be reworked.  The Court stated that a state may only pro-
scribe speech if it is first, “directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action” and, second, “likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion.”105 
Although a clearer test may help in differentiating what is a 
threat and what is protected speech, it is imperative that the Court 
continue to protect free speech.  The First Amendment protections 
are a vital part of the United States Constitution, as well as the New 
York State Constitution, and free speech should be entitled to strong 
protection by the courts. 
 




105 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
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